The controlled clinical trial is under trial in certain places: the reasons seem well intended but mistaken, and a threat exists to the scientific development of new remedies. None of the issues discussed is new; all were debated by Bradford Hill (1959, 1963 a. b) and L J Witts (1959) in the early years of regular trial' use. However, increasing knowledge has broadened the applicability of trial methods, and rediscussion is inevitable and healthy.
One difficulty is that much of the new debate has arisen in Germany or in France, and first hand accounts are not easy to get. Reviews of some of the problems have been published by Burckhardt & Kienle (1978) , Lellouch & Schwartz (1971) and Arpaillange & Gaston (1978) . Contributions from North America include papers by Byar et al. (1976) , Shaw & Chalmers (1970) , Colton (1963) , Zelen (1969) , Meier (1975) and Pocock (1976) , and in the United Kingdom a paper by Simmons (1978) and a leader in The Lancet (1979) have been published.
It is interesting, but not immediately helpful, to note that the criticism of trials often springs from lawyers or journalists who share a determinist ('who done it') outlook but seem to lack insight into biostatistical variance and risk, or of the cost of gaining knowledge to help people. They also seem to arise in places where Claude Bernard is still esteemed highly, not only for his origination of methods in physiology, but also for his vivid antagonism to the methods of statistics (Bernard 1865) .
If valid objections exist, trials deserve to be curtailed -but not if there are only well meant misunderstandings. A controlled clinical trial is the only method to decrease doubt about the value of most new remedies; without it medicine would return to its historic subjection to bias, ignorance and personal gain. The problem is whether people are willing to pay enough to gain the prize of objectively accredited therapy.
What are the problems? One is that unscientific systems of medicine exist, and their believed benefits and financial rewards are such that they will probably continue. Is it then fair to apply scientific methods to them, and to refuse their drugs if scientific tests fail to show their efficacy? I Based on paper read to Section of Measurement in Medicine, 19 May 1980 0141-0768/81/020085-04/$01.00/0
The suggested alternative is to rely on expert opinion, and to abandon trials as a necessary test criterion for all remedies. This alternative has already been adopted in the laws of some European countries (Gross 1980) . My reply would be that 'expert' opinion may not only be biased or prejudiced or influenced by extramedical factors; experts also reflect group opinions and beliefs and. do not necessarily provide new experience of drug effects. A trial perforce is ordered experience. What is more, if there are experts there must be non-experts; how does one discriminate between them? If a man makes a valid trial, he then becomes the 'expert' on that matter, and on that alone. He is the most relevant person to be asked about it because he has gained personal experience of the new remedy in an ordered way. What matters is whether or not the patients, not an expert, preferred a remedy.
It is said, not surprisingly, that doctors differ; how then can we be sure that there is real uncertainty about the effects of remedies, such that it becomes ethical to make a trial? But this does not make it wrong to do experiments; if it is indeed true that experts cannot agree on the need for a trial, then why consult them without making a trial, which is the suggested alternative? And surely greater disagreement justifies greater efforts: to gain knowledge? There never has been full agreement about the need for a trial, just different degrees of assent, and there are undoubtedly large, numbers of instances where informed persons will' agree that a trial is needed, or can justify their action in making a trial retrospectively.
Then it is argued that trials are set up to reveal facts, and to study defined questions, but that they may end up as instruments of decision for other questions because unforeseen problems often modify their expected outcome. The suggested remedy is to avoid trials, perhaps using aspects of 'decision theory' instead. My response is that trials should be expected to have many potential decision points, and no one can foresee which will predominate in clinical value. This does not imply, in retrospect, that the choice of decision points was wrong in the light of past knowledge, since trials are designed to gain knowledge. Gaining knowledge so as to force a change of decision point shows that that trial was a success, provided that some valid conclusions can be reached. This is a crucial aspect of the argument which recurs throughout the debate. A doctrine seems to have arisen, which I believe is itself unethical and pernicious, that people can be blamed for having made false decisions in the light of evidence which is shown subsequently to have been inadequate, but where new evidence accrued because they decided as they did. In short, they decided upon a trial which elicits new facts, which in turn reveal that they were mistaken in those beliefs which seemed to necessitate a trial. But the fact that the unforeseeable can be usefully explored is the reason for making trials, hence the doctrine of retrospective blame is pernicious.
This very point reappears in the notion that a trial was wrongly conceived if a treatment difference begins to appear during it, though the trial must then be prolonged to the point of statistical significance. Smaller trials, early stopping rules, adaptive trial designs or the avoidance of trials altogether, have all been advocated at times to remedy this imaginary defect. But well designed trials are constructed so that they will stop once a result has been achieved which convinces their authors that a defined question has been properly put and answered from the data; it is all a matter of gaining evidence in orderly ways so that it will change medical opinion. To stop before that point is simply to prolong needless debate, to consign a larger number of patients to uncertainty about their treatment, and so in effect to damage far more than might have received inferior therapy in a trial (Meier 1975) . Though many investigators seem ignorant of methods which minimize the numbers at risk from inferior treatments in trials, and though it is obviously right to use these methods wherever possible, they must not be falsely chosen in such a way that an uncertain trial result appears. This, in fact, consigns far more people to inferior therapy than would have suffered in a well conducted trial. Why is it that people feel less uneasy about providing inferior therapy through ignorance than they do about providing it during experiments designed to dispell ignorance? Reasons for avoiding adaptive designs at present, however relevant they seem, have been discussed by Simon (1977) and by Lellouch & Schwartz (1971) .
A subtle variant of this argument, advanced by a lawyer (Fincke, quoted by Burckhardt & Kienle 1978) , was that since doctors only make trials when they think they have better remedies, the patients in such trials who receive a remedy which is believed to be inferior are damaged by those doctors, should that trial later confirm their suspicion. Hence trials are said to be unethical and also open to legal attack. This seems to be a dreadful misuse of logic; until a trial has been made no one has any strong or valid reasons to believe that one remedy is superior, however much he may feel that this is the case. That is why he decided to make the trial. Experiments are designed to strengthen a belief from something which cannot convince others to something which seems convincing in the present state of knowledge. They neither create nor destroy belief; they confirm and strengthen it (or the converse). It seems incontrovertible that until a trial has been made to some predetermined significance boundaries, no one knows with any degree of certainty which treatment is the better -whatever his expectations may have been. The reverse of expectation is found quite frequently, and post hoc confirmation of some suspicion does not reflect the propriety of a man's former state of mind, for we inhabit a world of conflicting evidence.
Bayesian methods have been suggested as one way to reduce this problem. Unfortunately, the situations where these methods can be used in medicine are still quite rare (Barnett 1973) and prior information can be as biased as a current sample. It has also been suggested that a whole range of 'adaptive trial designs' might be used to minimize the unwitting allocation of patients to inferior treatments. Relevant and desirable though these methods are, they require much more research exploration before they can be applied to most trial problems, and in any case doctors are not ready to understand or assimilate them (Simon 1977) .
Another contention is that clinical trials have changed medicine by introducing ethics for the group rather than ethics based upon the needs of individuals (Lellouch & Schwartz 1971) . It is argued that trials are unethical, or that a lot of new thought should be given to group ethics before they can be respectable. The suggestion seems to be that clinical trials have introduced a new ethic into medicine by stealth, as it were. But groups are made up of individuals, and trials are made upon groups not merely by statistical necessity but also because there is no way to discriminate between the individuals in the group. Indeed, were it not so the very statistical methods used would be inapplicable. What is more, properly designed trials always incorporate a withdrawal clause which operates when any trial subject is found to differ perceptibly from the group. Hence this argument seems to be based upon a lack of statistical understanding. Until the trial result is known, no one knows which is the better therapy for any individual subject; this argument remains even should the trial itself disclose unexpected differences amongst the subjects. Up to that decision point, what is better for the group is (within the limits of prior knowledge) what is better for the individual, otherwise it would be unethical to make the trial. And, a fortiori, many more individuals will be damaged by uncertainty about treatment than will suffer inferior therapy in a well constructed trial which discloses useful information. This remains true even if facts are sometimes disclosed by serendipity or simple observation, for those situations are uncommon. Most clinically important differences between treatments do not emerge in those ways. Lastly, there are many other medical precedents for 'group ethics'; e.g. vaccination, medicine in the armed forces, (fluoridation of water. However contentious these may seem, trials were not the first such influences upon medicine.
One way round this problem might be to invite patients to accept either a 'contract for treatment' or a 'contract for experiment'. In the former, only what is believedto be best for the individual would be given; in the latter, choices would be made for the group. However, this suggests that the outcome of all 'treatment' is not experimental but can be foreseen, which is of course quite untrue.
Another argument is that doctors force a false deception upon patients in some single blind trials, or upon themselves and their patients in double blind studies. It is argued that physicians are not really ignorant of treatment differences, but must appear to be for scientific reasons. This argument is quite -false; not only is true blindness possible and valuable in reducing bias, but there is also no reason for thinking that the doctor and the patient do not share the ethical burden together in a properly double blind study. Gaining knowledge is always costly; this is part of that cost. The reason for using blind procedures may be stated lightly as the belief of all doctors that they are right; but all doctors know that other doctors can be wrong. So ignorance is real, but is often unacknowledged.
There are also criticisms which are more simply answered. Consent is said to be invalid, since no one really grasps risk; this problem can be minimized by using the 'subjects' friend' procedure, by permitting voluntary withdrawal at anytime, and by peer review. Placebos are held to deceive. But one can have strict rules for their use and also can use a form of words to the patients which conserves trust. For example, one can explain that placebos are not without actions, but they benefit the body only through the mind, not by direct effects on body cells. It can be explained that they will be used in certain parts of the treatment schedule but their time of use withheld. The patient then knows what will happen, but not, when, and can be assured that his health will be safeguarded by careful observation throughout the tests. He may also be glad to know that placebos do not have adverse effects, save those of drug withdrawal, whereas other drugs may cause active harm as well as benefit.
It is often said that the results of trials can seldom be generalized. This is an admitted difficulty, though numbers of clear-cut successes show the need to make some trials. The answer must be to design trials so as to be representative, rather than to give clearer answers to problems which lack general relevance.
Trials are often unpublished, it is said. The answer is to publish them. Adverse reactions are poorly detected by small trials, but the large multicentre trials now being used by national research organizations have proved highly satisfactory for the collection of adverse reaction data.
Behind all these difficulties lie certain core problems which must be accepted though they cannot be solved. They are in the nature of life on earth, and permit no idealistic solutions which glide past their rugged contours. They are these: (l) The arrow of time flies only forwards; no one can foresee trial outcomes. They are needed to increase his certainty of retrospective knowledge.
(2) Events cluster at points in time (e.g. the time of discovery of a new drug). A cohort of patients will inevitably bear the brunt of accrediting the new treatment at that time, a burden which is unfair but cannot be borne by those at other times.
(3) Biological variation exists. Determinism has little value in relation to it, and could a determinist description of an" individual's problem be found it would be valueless (Lindley 1965) . , (4) Ignorance has risks, but they are largely unseen and unnoticed. Gaining knowledge has risks which are noticed, but largely unpredictable, and it is very costly (though less so than prolonged ignorance). It focuses blame, whereas ignorance dispels it. So, maintaining ignorance often seems more attractive than gaining knowledge. (5) Law and scienceare both abstractions from the natural universe, with human ideological constructions upon them. But they spring from totally different premises. Law prescribes, science describes; but nature reveals herself to science. (6) People are conservative, biased, judgemental, selfishand forgetful, hence the need for good trials to increase their belief in what exists, not in what they might imagine.
Duncan Vere
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Social psychiatry
The 1967 meeting of the American Psychopathological Association was devoted to social psychiatry. It elicited a wide range of views on the nature and compass of the subject. George Rosen (1968) , who has made the most illuminating contributions to the history of its development, selected for approval the broad view that it is 'any work which deals with the relationship of social and individual variables', but suggested that 'social psychiatry can be considered still more broadly by thinking of it as a facet of social medicine, which may be defined as the study of the . relationships between health phenomena and social factors and contexts'. Such claims on behalf of social psychiatry have been attacked from two flanks: from clinicians who deny the need for departure from their traditional role in dealing with individuals, and from social scientists who see in it an extension of medicine's pretensions. The latter view was outspokenly expressed at the 1967 meeting by Barbara Wootton, who planted arresting 'No Trespass' notices on what she regarded as moral, ethical and legal territory, calling to her aid the extravagant contortions of Dr Thomas Szasz whose 'onslaught', she says, 'on the expansionists seems to me to be timely and salutary' (Wootton 1968) .
It is noteworthy that Lady Wootton offered no grounds for her contention that social psychiatry 0141-0768(81(020088-03($01.00(0 has a legitimate field of operation. While many of her strictures will receive the endorsement of wide psychiatric opinion, the suspicion that the baby has disappeared with the bath water undermines much of the value of her cleansing enterprise. In a later discussion of the same issue (Wootton 1977) she very clearly states the dilemma which, she implies, is insoluble. By what criterion, she asks, taking up clinical issues, do we judge whether affective function is healthy when 'everyone who falls in love experiences emotional disturbanceare they therefore mentally sick?'; again' ... the difference between deficiency of intelligence per se and the severe condition is purely social based on ability to satisfy the demands of society. But that capacity is inextricably related to the state of the economy Thus it is the instability of social conditions which elevates or depresses his mental categorization'; and, taking up a broader question, 'any glib assumption that mental health depends on ... adaptation of the mind to its physical or social environment founders on the double question of what is to be adapted to what ... On the one hand, adaptation to the social environment inevitably involves judgements of value ... on the other hand man has a unique capacity ... to modify both his physical and social environment'.
Quite so. The inescapable social dimension in psychiatry is here clearly revealed and, although the author puts her questions rhetorically, they must nevertheless be answered by the psychiatrist, as best he may, in many aspects of his regular work.
The sharpest dissection of the social element in the physician's task of distinguishing health and disease has been provided by the founding father of social psychiatry in Britain, Sir Aubrey Lewis, in his challenging essay 'Health as a Social Concept' (Lewis 1953) . He demonstrates that in both common usage and formal definition the notion of health contains the conception of fulfilment of social function or social well-being; that the physician, whether judging a patient's subjective report, the objective evidence of disturbed function and structure, or the physiological and psychological equilibrium of the body working as a whole, will, explicitly or implicitly, at each stage appeal to norms conditioned by the widely differing geographical, climatic, cultural, occupational and other environmental conditions of human life. These considerations apply a fortiori to mental health where 'there must be adjustment of functions' within the organism, keeping its internal milieu steady; there must be adaptation of this integrated organism to its surroundings so that it remains unharmed, in spite of changing conditions'. When social adaptation is assessed 'value judgements
